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What to tell a candidate when the company is struggling

Nine months of runway and a round that has not closed. Say nothing and you hire someone who would have said no. Say it badly and you hire nobody. There is a version that does neither.

15 Nov 2026 13 min read By Joshua Pi’Rwot
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You have nine months of runway, a round that has been closing for eleven weeks, and an offer out to someone good who is leaving a stable job.

You have not decided what to tell them. They will find out either way, and the only variable you control is whether they hear it from you before they accept or from someone else after.

Why these three models

The decision is how much to disclose about the company’s position to someone you are trying to hire. The features that fire are a set of claims the candidate has no way of verifying, a market in which candidates read each other rather than evaluating independently, and a reputation in a small talent pool that this period will write into.

Three lenses. Certification produces an equilibrium answer about which of your claims can carry any weight. Observational learning produces a complex answer about how they will actually decide. Reputation decay produces a cycle answer about the cost of getting this wrong, which lands long after the individual hire. The third is the one that should settle it, and it is the one nobody weighs at the time.

1. Give them something they can check

Start from the candidate’s position. They cannot see your bank balance, your pipeline or your term sheet. Everything you tell them about the company’s health is a claim from an interested party, and they know that, which is why reassurance does so little work.

A claim carries information in proportion to what it would cost to make falsely.1 We are in a strong position is free to say and therefore establishes nothing. The specific alternatives are expensive in exactly the right way, and all of them are available to you.

Tell them the runway in months, as a number, with the date it was calculated. Name the customers, so they can look them up. Offer a call with an existing employee you have not briefed. Offer a call with an investor. Show them the last board update or a redacted version. Each of those would be costly to offer if the picture were bad, which is precisely why offering them settles more than any amount of confident framing.

The reassurance is free and they discount it. The bank number with a date on it is expensive and they do not.

The counter-intuitive part is that disclosure of a difficult position often strengthens the offer rather than weakening it. A candidate who is told nine months, here is the plan, here is what would change it has been given something no other company gave them, and the willingness to be checked is itself the strongest signal available about how you will behave once they are inside.

The concrete form is three sentences and it fits inside a normal conversation. We have nine months of runway as at the thirtieth of last month. The round is at term sheet with one investor and we expect it to close in November, and if it does not close we cut to a fourteen-month plan, which means two of the four roles currently open do not get filled. Here is the engineer who joined in March, call her without me in the room. That version carries a number, a date, what happens if the good outcome does not arrive, and a way to check all three. Each of the four is doing work that no amount of confident framing does.

What does not work is the middle: a vague acknowledgement that things are challenging, without numbers. It is read as concealment with a disclaimer attached, and it forfeits both the reassurance and the credibility.

The failure mode of the whole approach is a number that moves. You said nine months in September. By November a large customer has paid late and it is seven. If they learn that from the atmosphere around payroll rather than from you, the disclosure you were proud of becomes the thing you were wrong about, and it costs more than saying nothing would have. So treat a runway figure given to a candidate as a commitment to keep updating it. Recalculate monthly, and send that person two lines whenever it moves by more than a month in either direction, through their first year at least. It is a small operational habit, and it is what converts one act of candour into the standing other people will hear described.

2. They are reading each other, not you

The second lens explains why the decision may not be yours to influence directly.

A candidate assessing an early company holds a weak private signal and can observe what others have done. Under those conditions the rational move is to follow rather than to evaluate: who else joined recently, who left, what the market says.2 Your account of the company is one input among several and not the heaviest.

Which means the things that actually move the decision are mostly outside the interview. Whether anyone good joined in the last quarter. Whether someone visible left. What a mutual contact says when asked, which they will be. In a small ecosystem those channels are fast and they are not neutral: a departure gets discussed and a quiet successful quarter does not.

Two consequences. The first is that you should assume the candidate will hear the difficult version from somebody, and plan the conversation as a correction rather than as a disclosure. Getting there first means your account is the one they check others against rather than the other way round.

The second is that a cascade is fragile to a credible public fact, which cuts in your favour. One named recent hire they respect, or one investor willing to take their call, breaks the copying more effectively than any argument about the plan. If you have such a fact, it is worth more in this conversation than anything you can say about the future.

Then there is the candidate who does the opposite of what this section assumes and checks nothing at all. They accept within a day, ask no questions, and take your account at face value. Read that as information rather than as a win. Either they have no network in this market, which means they will have nobody to calibrate against when a hard month arrives, or they are not weighing the risk. In both cases the disclosure did not land even though you made it. The fix is to make the check happen anyway. Put them on a call with a current employee, and with someone who has left if one will take it, before the offer goes out. Treat reluctance to make either call as a reason to slow down rather than to move faster.

3. This period is being written into a small market

The third lens is the one that should decide the policy rather than the individual case.

Your standing as an employer is a flow rather than a balance. It is replenished by what people recently observed and it decays without maintenance, which means how you behave during a difficult period is disproportionately what gets remembered.3

In a small talent market, and most African tech markets are small, the population of people you might hire in the next five years overlaps heavily with the population who will hear about this. A candidate who joins without knowing the position and discovers it in month two tells that story for years, accurately, and it is a story about what you did rather than about what happened to the company.

That asymmetry is the whole argument. The cost of full disclosure is one candidate declining, which is recoverable. The cost of a candidate who accepts, discovers, and leaves is a hire, a salary, a gap, and an account of your conduct circulating among exactly the people you will need next.

The pattern also compounds in your favour when handled well. A market that has watched a founder give people accurate numbers during a bad period treats the next difficult conversation differently, and that is an asset built precisely at the moment it feels most expensive to build. The only time you can earn a reputation for candour is when candour costs you something.

There is a cheaper version for the founder who cannot show the underlying numbers. Investors sometimes forbid sharing board material, and some figures are genuinely not yours to hand over. What is left is still costly and therefore still works. Give the runway in months without the accounts behind it, name the month by which you would have to decide, and put the candidate in a room with somebody who has no reason to protect you. And where the difficult fact is already circulating, that a visible person left last quarter, raise it yourself in the first conversation and say what happened. A fact you introduce is evidence about you. The same fact introduced by somebody else is evidence about what you were willing to leave out.

There is also a selection effect worth naming honestly, and it is not entirely comfortable. Full disclosure filters toward candidates who can absorb the risk, which correlates with having savings or another household income, because who accepts a set of terms is decided by private information those people hold rather than by the terms alone.4 A struggling company that discloses fully will find its offers accepted disproportionately by people who can afford uncertainty, and that is a real narrowing which no amount of good intent removes. It is a reason to be generous on the terms you can control, not a reason to disclose less.

What the three say together

  • Give the runway as a number with a date, name customers, and offer an unbriefed call with an employee or an investor.
  • Say it before the offer, not after acceptance. First-hand and early beats accurate and second-hand.
  • Lead with the checkable fact you have: a recent respected hire, an investor who will take their call.
  • Never let them discover it in month two. That converts a company problem into a story about you.

Where they disagree

The certification argument and the cascade argument disagree about timing.

Certification says disclose early and completely, because the willingness to be checked is the strongest signal available and it works best before they have formed a view. A disclosure offered rather than extracted carries information that the same facts, produced under questioning, do not.

The cascade argument says a candidate hearing difficult news early, before they have any positive evidence, has nothing to weigh it against and will simply decline, and that the sequence matters: let them meet the team, see the product and form their own read, then give them the numbers while they have something to set against them.

The resolution is that both agree on before the offer and disagree only about which conversation inside the process. Put the numbers in the conversation immediately before the offer, when they have met people and can weigh it, and never after. What fails is disclosure after acceptance, which both arguments condemn and which is where the pressure of a live process pushes you.

What none of them contain

None of the three handles the candidate who accepts and should not have. Some people will take the risk for reasons that are about their own situation rather than about your evidence, and a founder who discloses fully and hires someone who cannot afford the outcome has met the standard in this article and not the one that matters.

None of them prices what the conversation does to the people already there. A founder giving runway numbers to candidates while the existing team has not had the same conversation has created an information order that will not survive the first week, and it should be handled internally first.

And one property the ensemble will not produce: telling a candidate the position changes the company. It is a commitment, made to someone outside, that you will be honest about the numbers, and it makes the next internal conversation harder to avoid. That is usually good and it is not free, and founders who dislike disclosing to candidates are often reacting to that rather than to the hiring risk.

The one action that survives the ignorance: before your next offer goes out, decide the runway number you will give and the date it was calculated. If you would not say it, the problem is not the disclosure policy, and the candidate is not the person you need to talk to first.

Who has to move

The founder, and before the offer rather than during the notice period, because every advantage here comes from being first and it is gone once they have accepted. The instinct is to close the hire and explain afterwards, which is generous in intent and converts a survivable company problem into a durable personal one. The cheapest first test is to write the sentence you would use, out loud, once. If it cannot be said plainly in one sentence with a number in it, that is the finding, and it is about the company rather than about the wording.

Sources and notes

  1. Jeffrey Carpenter and Andrea Robbett, Game Theory and Behavior, MIT Press. Certification and costly signalling, and the result that a claim separates types only in proportion to what it would cost to make falsely, are developed in the chapters on signalling and asymmetric information. Used in section 1, including the practical corollary that offering an unbriefed reference call is expensive to the extent the picture is bad, which is what makes the offer itself informative.
  2. Jeffrey Carpenter and Andrea Robbett, Game Theory and Behavior, MIT Press. Information cascades, in which decision-makers with weak private signals follow observed choices rather than their own assessment, are treated in the chapters on social learning. The underlying results are due to Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, and to Banerjee, both 1992. Used in section 2, including the fragility of a cascade to a single credible public fact, which is why one named recent hire outperforms any argument about the plan.
  3. Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Econometrica 72(2), 2004, pages 407 to 432, developed at book length in George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, 2006. Under imperfect monitoring a reputation is temporary and is replenished by recent conduct. Used in section 3 for the claim that behaviour during a difficult period is disproportionately what a market remembers.
  4. Jeffrey Carpenter and Andrea Robbett, Game Theory and Behavior, MIT Press. Adverse selection, in which the population that accepts a set of terms is determined by private information those parties hold, is developed in the same chapters. Cited for the selection effect named in section 3: full disclosure shifts acceptance toward candidates who can personally absorb the risk, which narrows the pool in a direction that correlates with existing wealth rather than with ability.

A note on a number this article does not give. There is no runway figure below which disclosure becomes obligatory. The obligation is not a threshold, it is that a candidate leaving a stable job is making a decision on facts only you hold. What transfers is the form: a number, a date, and an offer to be checked.

Joshua Agonya Pi’Rwot, Founder.

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